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States territory, but also of possible retaliatory actions by other states. 48 The
HIT court's expansion of a basis for subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., significant conduct in the United States when there is no finding of substantial
effect on American interests or American investors, seems reasonable and
desirable.
PAUL V. HERBERS

RIGHT TO COUNSEL PRIOR TO SUBMISSION TO
BREATHALYZER TEST-THE IMPACT OF
MISSOURI SUPREME COURT
RULE 37.89
Gooch v. Spradlingi2
Spradlingv. Deimeke
John Gooch was arrested for driving while intoxicated and was taken to
a police station where the arresting officer requested that Gooch submit to a
breathalyzer test. Gooch asked to consult with his attorney before deciding
whether to submit to the breathalyzer test but this request was denied. The
officer continued to offer the test to Gooch, but after a series of refusals, the
officer filled out a refusal form in accordance with section 564.444, RSMo
1969.3 Pursuant to the same statute, Gooch's operator's license was revoked
for one year. The revocation was based on Gooch's refusal to take the

48. Becker thinks that one effect of an application of the Securities Exchange
Act that violates international law would be the risk that other states will do the same
resulting in a "crazy-quilt of law covering sales of stocks and bonds issued by
corporations of international investment interest." SeeBecker, ExtraterritorialDimensions of the Securities Exchange Act, 2 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 233, 234 (1969). The
Bersch court noted the dubious binding effect of a judgment for the defendants on
absent foreign plaintiffs in the large class action case. Bersch also expressed doubts
about the propriety of purporting to bind those foreign plaintiffs. See Goldman &
Magrino, Some ForeignAspects of SecuritiesRegulation:Towardsa Reevaluation of Section
30(b) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, 55 VA. L. REv. 1015, 1026 (1969), for alist
of various factors to determine whether a statute should be given extraterritorial
application. See also Comment, ExtraterritorialApplicationofthe SecuritiesExchange Act
of 1934,69 COLUM. L. REv. 94, 104-09 (1969), which considers formation of a general
rule.
1. 523 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975).
2. 528 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. 1975).
3. The refusal form was authorized by § 564.444, RSMo 1969. See statute
quoted note 8 infra.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977

1

1977]

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 18
RECENT CASES

breathalyzer test.4 Gooch filed a petition for review as authorized under
section 564.444, RSMo 1969,- and the circuit court set aside the revocation.
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City District, affirmed, holding that
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 37.896 entitled Gooch to
an opportunity to
7
consult with an attorney "at all times" after his arrest.

Sections 564.441-.444, RSMo 1969,8 are often referred to as the
"implied consent" law. However, the court in Gooch pointed out that this is
actually a misnomer because the motorist does in fact have a real option,
either to consent to the breathalyzer test or refuse it.9 This view is in
10
agreement with the position in the majority of states with similar statutes.
The holding in Goochwas based on Missouri Supreme Court Rule 37.89,
which guarantees the right to consult with counsel to "[e.very person
4. See statute quoted note 8 infra.
5. Id.
6. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 37.89 provides:
Every person arrested and held in custody by any peace officer in any
jail, police station or any other place, upon or without a warrant or other
process for the alleged commission of an offense or upon suspicion
thereof, shall be permitted to consult with counsel or other persons in his
behalf at all times and, for such purposes, to use a telephone if one be
available.
7. 523 S.W.2d at 866.
8. Section 564.441, RSMO 1969, provides in part:
Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this
state shall be deemed to have given consent to, subject to the provisions of
sections 564.441,564.442 and 564.444, a chemical test of his breath for the
purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for
any offense arising out of acts which the arresting officer had reasonable
grounds to believe were committed while the person was driving a motor
vehicle while intoxicated. The test shall be administered by or at the
direction of a law enforcement officer whenever the person has been
arrested for the offense.
Section 564.444, RSMo 1969, provides in part:
If a person under arrest refuses upon the request of the arresting officer to
submit to a chemical test, which request shall include the reasons of the
officer fbr requesting the person to submit to a test and which also shall
inform the person that his license may be revoked upon his refusal to take
the test, then none shall be given. In this event, the arresting officer, if he so
believes, shall make a sworn report to the director of revenue that he has
reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested person was driving a motor
vehicle upon the public highways of this state while in an intoxicated
condition and that, on his request, refused to submit to the test. Upon
receipt of the officer's report, the director shall revoke the license of the
person refusing to take the test for a period of not more than one year; or if
the person arrested be a nonresident, his operating permit or privilege
shall be revoked for not more than one year; or if the person is a resident
without a license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in this state, an order
shall be issued denying the person the issuance of a license or permit for a
period of not more than one year.
9. 523 S.W.2d at 865.
10. See, e.g., Brady v. Tofany, 36 App. Div. 2d 987, 320 N.Y.S.2d 880 (1971);
Blow v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 83 S.D. 628, 164 N.W.2d 351 (1969).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/18
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The Gooch court

read rule 37.89 in conjunction with sections 564.441-.444, RSMo 1969, and
concluded that the rule's right to counsel guarantee was applicable to the
breathalyzer test situation.' 2 This decision is supported by Missouri Supreme Court Rule 37.02 which states that rule 37.89 is to apply to all
municipal court proceedings and traffic cases.' 3 The interpretation is also in
accord with decisions from other states with similar statutory provisions.14
A matter not entirely resolved in the Gooch opinion is what constitutes
"consulting with counsel" in the breathalyzer test situation. The language of
the rule indicates that the telephone is but one of the means authorized and
does not rule out in-person consultations between the licensee and his
attorney.' 5 In Gooch, the court implied that consulting with counsel under
rule 37.89 includes consultation either by telephone or in person if the
attorney can promptly reach the location where the test is to be given.' 6
However, the court indicated in dictum that rule 37.89 does not require that
the licensee be given in-person consultation with his attorney where he has
previously consulted with his attorney by telephone.' 7
The recent Missouri Supreme Court decision in Spradlingv. Deimeke'8
addressed many of the issues raised in the Gooch opinion. Deimeke was
arrested at 1:45 a.m. for driving while intoxicated. The arresting officer
requested that Deimeke submit to a breathalyzer test and informed him of
the consequences should he refuse. Deimeke agreed to take the test. He
arrived at the location where the test was to be administered about 2:30 a.m.
Deimeke was pemitted to telephone his attorney and did in fact communicate with him. After the telephone conversation, Deimeke stated that he was
not going to take the test without the presence of his attorney. The officer
wrote the matter up as a refusal, and Deimeke's driver's license was revoked
for one year. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the revocation by
holding that Deimeke's request to have counsel present as a condition
precedent to taking the breathalyzer test constituted a refusal within the
meaning of section 564.444, RSMo 1969.19
The Deimeke court found that there was no constitutional right to
counsel in the breathalyzer test situation. With regard to the administrative
nature of license revocation, this position is in line with that taken in the
majority of other states. 20 However, the Deimeke court did not purport to
11. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 37.89.

12. 523 S.W.2d at 866.

13. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 37.02.
14. Siegwald v. Curry, 40 Ohio App. 2d 313,318,319 N.E.2d 381,385 (1974).

15. See rule quoted note 6 supra.
16. 523 S.W.2d at 867.
17. Id.
18. 528 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. 1975).

19. Id. at 766.
20. See, e.g., Calvert v.State Dep't of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 519 P.2d 341

(Colo. 1974); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724, 211 N.W.2d 906 (1973); Phaves v.
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distinguish between the administrative procedure of license revocation and
the criminal prosecution for driving while intoxicated. Other state courts
have carefully distinguished the two situations and have limited their
holdings that there 21is no constitutional right to counsel to the license
revocation situation.
Addressing the claim of statutory right to counsel under rule 37.89, the
supreme court approved the holding in Gooch, that there is a statutory right
to consult with counsel prior to deciding whether to submit to a breathalyzer
test. 22 However, the court further determined that rule 37.89 does not
guarantee a licensee the right to have an attorney present at such test nor to
condition his consent to take the test on the presence of counsel during the
test.2 3 This interpretation seems clearly mandated if the statute providing
for the administration of breathalyzer tests is not to be completely frustrated. However, presence of counsel during the administration of the test is
not precluded. The court said that if the attorney arrives before or during
the administration of the test, the licensee has the right to have the attorney
24
present during the testing procedure.
With respect to the right to consult under rule 37.89, the Deimeke court
stated:
In the instant case, appellant was afforded and exercised his right
to call his lawyer and did not consult with him on the phone. If his
lawyer had come to the police station,2 5appellant would have had the
right to consult with him in person.
This language can be interpreted to mean that the licensee has the right to
consult with his attorney both by telephone and in person at the testing
location if his attorney promptly arrives there. Another possible interpretation is that once the licensee has received the advice of his attorney by
telephone, his right to consult under rule 37.89 has been satisfied, and he is
not entitled to consult with his attorney again at the test location. This
interpretation is equivalent to reading the second sentence of the quoted
Dep't of Pub. Safety, 507 P.2d 1225 (Okla. 1973); Blow v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles,
83 S.D. 628, 164 N.W.2d 351 (1969).
21. See, e.g., Blow v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 83 S.D. 628, 164 N.W.2d 351
(1969); Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1173, 140 N.W.2d 866 (1966).
22. 528 S.W.2d at 763. This right is based on Mo. Sup. CT. R. 37.89. This
position was followed in Dain v. Spradling, 534 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1976).

23. 528 S.W.2d at 764. The supreme court stated the reasoning for this
position:
[I]t must be immediately recognized that if a person is entitled to have
someone else of their choosing present as a condition to performing the
breathalyzer test, then the test is readily avoidable. The person who has
been requested to be present may not come or he may delay arrival until a
time when the alcohol has been dissipated. The practical result would
simply be a readily available technique to circumvent the implied consent
law.
24. 528 S.W.2d at 763.
25. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/18
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language to mean "if instead his lawyer had come. . . ." The latter interpretation is consistent with the construction of rule 37.89 advanced by the Gooch
court. 2' That interpretation is also supported by the Deimeke court's statement that the purpose of rule 37.89 is to afford the licensee a reasonable
time to contact his attorney and get the benefit of his lawyer's advice.2 7 This
purpose is satisfied by the initial telephone conversation. Requiring inperson consultation after the licensee has already consulted with his attorney
by telephone would enable the licensee to delay the administration of the
breathalyzer test. The Deimeke court expressly stated that a licensee is not
entitled to delay the test until his attorney arrives. 28 Thus, the supreme
court's interpretation of rule 37.89 should probably be understood to
recognize the right of each licensee to one consultation whether in person or
by telephone.
The determination that the licensee is entitled to one consultation with
his attorney before deciding whether to submit to the breathalyzer test is not
a final resolution of the problem. Consider the situation where the licensee
contacts his attorney by telephone and all his attorney tells him is that he will
be right over. Technically, the licensee has had the opportunity to consult
with counsel. Moreover, in Deimeke, the supreme court stated that a licensee
could not condition his consent to take the breathalyzer test on the presence
of counsel. However, assuming that the delay would not jeopardize the
validity of the breathalyzer test, the police would be unwise, on the strength
of Deimeke, to refuse to wait a few minutes for the licensee's attorney to
arrive.
Another troublesome situation not addressed by the Deimeke court is
where the licensee calls his attorney and talks to his secretary. The secretary
might inform the attorney of the situation and he might instruct her to relay
the message that he is on his way to the place of detention. In this situation it
is harder to show that the licensee has had an opportunity to consult with
counsel. To say that the licensee had an opportunity to consult with counsel
in this situation could be viewed as denying his right to consult solely because
of the actions of his attorney. However, if the situation is not viewed as an
opportunity for the licensee to consult with counsel, it constitutes a method
for the licensee to evade the impact of the Deimeke decision. In Deimeke, the
court did not make it clear whether the licensee can postpone his decision to
submit to the breathalyzer test in this manner.
Neither court elected to fix a specific amount of time to which a licensee
is entitled in his attempt to obtain the advice of counsel under rule 37.89.
The Gooch court, while acknowledging that there was a limit to the time
period that is afforded a licensee to contact his attorney under rule 37.89,
said that a telephone call made within a few minutes of the request or
counsel's presence secured within the hour did not exceed the time period
26. 523 S.W.2d at 867.
27. 528 S.W.2d at 765.
28. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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required. 29 In Deimeke, the supreme court asserted that a licensee must be
given a "reasonable time" to obtain the advice of counsel and that one hour
could be a "reasonable time."30 While police officers would undoubtedly
prefer a fixed time limit, the "reasonable time" test provides a workable
standard for the judiciary. What constitutes a "reasonable time" in the
breathalyzer test situation must necessarily be the subject of an independent
judicial determination based on the facts and circumstances of each case. It
should be emphasized, however, that once the licensee consults with his
attorney, his rights under rule 37.89 have been satisfied. The licensee is not
entitled to the balance of his "reasonable time" period to wait for his attorney
to arrive because he is not entitled to condition his consent upon the
presence of his attorney.
In both Gooch and Deimeke, the Missouri courts were faced with the
problem of reconciling the protections of rule 37.89 with the license revocation statutes. It is clear from these decisions that there is no constitutional
right to counsel in the breathalyzer test situation. The statutory protection of
rule 37.89 was clearly interpreted to entitle a licensee to a "reasonable time"
in which to contact and consult with his attorney before he may be deemed to
have refused the breathalyzer test. In most cases, this "reasonable time" will
probably be at least one hour. However, once the licensee consults with his
attorney either by telephone or in person, his rights under rule 37.89 will be
satisfied. The licensee may not condition his consent on his attorney's
presence during administration of the test, but he is entitled to the presence
of his attorney during the test if the attorney arrives before it is administered. These principles represent a workable compromise based on a
thoughtful consideration of the interests involved.
THOMAS

F.

DASSE

29. 523 S.W.2d at 867.
30. 528 S.W.2d at 764-65.
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Methadone Treatment and Rehabilitation Program
Discretionary Grant # 71-DF-679.
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